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A B S T R A C T 
 
We model simple and novel three-player bi-form coalitional games to analyse community energy projects in Chile and 
Scotland. We take into account two methods based on biform games, which deal with games with a non-empty Core and an 
empty Core, respectively, and construct models based on real-world data on community energy projects, net billing (or 
distributed generation) schemes, and ordinary utility contracts. We then use these to derive insights about the economic-
strategic viability of community energy projects, in the sense of stability within the projects or coalitions and competitiveness 
versus the other schemes. Under some mild assumptions, we find that community energy projects can be the best strategy to 
follow for residential electricity customers in Scotland and Chile. Cost subsidisation can further improve community energy 
incentives. Moreover, after a statistical simulation, we find that community energy projects present more opportunities to be 
implemented in comparison with net billing schemes in both countries. We use these results to draw conclusions for the 
community energy sector and show that biform games can be a valuable tool to analyse increasingly complex electricity 
markets. 
 




Citizen participation in energy production is increasingly becoming an important matter in many countries around the world. 
This is evidenced by the fact that the number of news items, reports, scientific articles, dedicated public and private 
organisations, and projects that are related to or involved in this matter is steadily increasing. Moreover, this concept is also 
progressively playing a major role in governments’ decisions, through a variety of public policies, laws and regulations that 
have been or are being implemented; an important example is article 16 on local energy communities in the European Union's 
electricity directive1. Unsurprisingly, the corresponding installed capacity of citizen-led electricity generation projects has 
increased remarkably during the last few years, especially in some European countries like Scotland [1-7]. There are other 
countries, like the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden, which show similar trends. Additionally, Germany and Denmark deserve 
mention, as these countries represent a model to follow given the nature and number of projects and their contribution to the 
generation mix [8-10]. These experiences can be used to encourage and help other less developed countries, like Chile, in 
promoting and implementing their own citizen-led projects in energy generation. In fact, the Chilean Government has explicitly 
declared its willingness to support a more decentralised system and a higher participation of citizens in energy markets as 
prosumers, rather than mere customers [11,12].  
 
                                                                
* Corresponding Author. Email address: fabian.fuentes@ed.ac.uk 




Under the broad umbrella of citizen participation in energy production, it is possible to find a wide variety of initiatives, such 
as community energy projects [13,14], distributed generation projects [15], locally-owned energy projects [16], projects based 
on hybrid partnerships (with public, private, and/or civil involvement) [10], among others. Of course, the diversity of projects 
will depend upon the specific context in each country or energy market.  
 
For the purposes of this paper, the focus will be on the emergence of community energy projects in Scotland and Chile. These 
initiatives are examined and contrasted, in the sense of economic-strategic viability, with other well-known schemes; 
specifically, net billing (or distributed generation) projects, and regular utility contracts. Economic-strategic viability means 
that an initiative or project provides the best possible payoff or outcome for the incumbents, given a feasible and rational 
strategy or set of actions. We recognise that there are other elements that might affect people’s decisions and/or behaviour 
related to the community energy emergence, such as psychological, sociological, legal, political, historical or environmental 
factors. These could be included in more realistic models, at a price of reducing model transparency and increasing 
computational cost. We therefore focus exclusively on the economic-strategic side of community energy initiatives. The best 
possible payoff or outcome can measured in terms of either monetary losses or benefits, depending on the circumstances. To 
be economic-strategically viable, community energy projects should guarantee to their members proper cooperation 
mechanisms and attractive incentives to join and remain a part of the project. Moreover, community energy projects should 
themselves be competitive compared to other ways of energy production, which implies offering higher benefits for their 
members, as well as a long-term sustainability. These characteristics imply a dual behaviour of community energy projects 
because, on the one hand, these projects need cooperation and, on the other hand, these initiatives need to compete with others 
projects. As far as we are aware, there are no existing studies that model such dual behaviour from an economic-strategic 
perspective.  
 
To derive insights about the stability inside projects (or coalitions) and competitiveness with other schemes, which can help 
policy makers encourage a thriving community energy sector through proper long-term public policies that are compatible 
with the energy market incumbents’ incentives, we therefore need new modelling frameworks. We use methods from game 
theory to analyse this setting. Game theory can be defined as a discipline that aims at determining the best possible outcome 
and the corresponding strategy (or set of actions) to get this outcome, for a number of decision-makers (players) who interact 
in a particular situation or context (game). Game theory also allows finding out what the players’ incentives are and whether 
they are aligned and affected by any stimulus that might imply changes (instability). In principle, games can be cooperative, 
where players cooperate with each other, and non-cooperative, where players do not cooperate but make their decisions 
individually to maximise their own benefits. There are also hybrid games, which consider cooperative and non-cooperative 
behaviour at the same time. Although these have not been applied to energy markets, to our best knowledge, we claim that 
they are especially appropriate to model the dual behaviour of community energy initiatives. In this vein, there exists a variety 
of hybrid games, however, this paper is focused on a simple and intuitive approach called biform games [17,18], which, as we 
will show, can be applied to electricity markets and the community energy sector. 
 
Adapting the existing literature, we therefore develop a specific application of biform games to the community energy 
emergence in Scotland and Chile, by formulating simple and novel three-player games. In these games, there exist two 
residential electricity consumers and a distributor or supplier, who provides electricity to both consumers. The residential 
electricity consumers might be involved in energy production by participating in either a net billing (or distributed generation) 
scheme or a community energy project. There are therefore two decisional components in this problem that are addressed by 
using biform games: a non-cooperative component related to being involved in electricity generation and a cooperative 
component related to the payoff distribution within a certain coalition or energy production initiative. Through the solution to 




energy projects a viable way of producing energy for residential customers?; and b) are community energy projects, in terms 
of providing the best possible payoff for residential customers, more competitive than other projects?  
 
Thus, this paper presents three contributions. First, this work provides a novel set of methods to quantify the economic-strategic 
viability of the community energy sector and the interaction with other projects or schemes, where most previous research 
focuses on qualitative methods. Second, we derive some lessons that can help people distribute a payoff or outcome among 
the members of a community energy project. Third, this paper is based on a methodology that is not currently widely used for 
the analysis of electricity markets and the community energy sector. We note that, since we are mainly concerned with 
demonstrating a new method and deriving qualitative insights, our models are highly simplified and we make a number of 
restrictive assumptions. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we present the theoretical background necessary to build up 
the biform games. In section 3, we reveal the main features and assumptions of our approach based on biform games. In section 
4, the results are shown. In section 5, a discussion of those results is given. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
2.1 State-of-the-art analysis of the community energy emergence 
 
A community energy project implies cooperation among the members, which is particularly crucial. People with different 
feelings, motivations, attitudes, judgement, professional background and experience, points of view, etc. [19-26], need to agree 
with others in order to successfully carry out and implement the project. Many studies show the importance of the social-
institutional elements in the emergence, constitution, and operation of community energy projects [14,19-22,27-35]. 
Additionally, because these initiatives are currently playing a role within liberalised electricity/energy markets, other studies 
characterise the (potential) incumbents of the community energy sector, as well as the market and its characteristics [9,23-
26,36-43].  
 
Fewer studies focus specifically on economic-financial aspects. In one study, Leontief’s Input-Output Model is applied to 
Scottish community energy projects to evaluate their impacts on the local economy [44]. Lakshmi & Tilley [45] determine the 
Return on Stakeholders’ Capital (RoSC) and Cost of Stakeholders' capital (CoSC) for a particular community energy project 
in England, for the purpose of monitoring and improving its functioning, regardless the scale. Berka et al. [46] calculate the 
expected Net Present Value (NPV) and Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) for community-owned projects at different 
development stages, and show the existence of higher costs, longer project development times, and higher risks, in comparison 
with commercial projects.  
 
In relation to the economic-strategic viability of projects, Abada et al. [47] analyse an energy community, understood as an 
initiative where several households in a given building decide to use a single meter and potentially cooperate and install solar 
photovoltaics (PV) panels. They point out that there is no assurance that coalitions of households will be viable and that this 
is affected by the installation costs, coordination costs, and sharing rules. Lo Prete & Hobbs [48] show how microgrid 
development affects costs and benefits for network incumbents (a utility company, a private investor in microgrids, and 
residential customers), highlighting market failures, the importance of microgrid introduction timing, and effects on prices. 
Lee et al. [49] analyse the cooperation between small-scale electricity suppliers and end-users in direct trading, proposing a 
fair pricing and revenue division scheme for them. There are also other studies that propose resources allocation schemes in 
different contexts [50-53]. More recently, Abada et al. [54] highlight the interaction between energy communities and a 





Hence, it seems that the prevailing trend has been to analyse the social-institutional features of community energy projects, 
principally dealing with psychological, sociological, historical, institutional, and/or political factors, in order to find out which 
category or categories significantly affects the emergence and success of community energy projects. Consequently, we can 
find relevant information about people’s attitudes and willingness towards community energy projects, the impact derived 
from particular public policies, the features of such projects that might help to clearly define community energy, and so on. 
Most of the aforementioned studies use statistical and social sciences techniques. On the other hand, the economic-financial 
side of the community energy emergence has received less attention, which indicates an opportunity to properly delve into this 
matter, for instance, by developing more advanced valuation models of such projects, new ways of funding, more knowledge 
about a suitable cash flow management, etc. Concerning the last group of studies related to the economic-strategic viability, it 
is important to highlight two elements of interest: firstly, most of these studies are based on cooperative game theory, where 
in essence players form coalitions to get the best possible payoff or outcome and distribute it among them, ensuring stability. 
The basic idea is then assuring that the members will remain in the coalition. Competition between community energy projects 
and other existing schemes is not considered in these studies. Secondly, these investigations take into account projects that are 
closer to or under the above-mentioned concept of distributed generation than that of community energy, mainly because the 
focus is on specific buildings and/or dwellings within these, rather than proper small or medium-scale power plants owned by 
communities. Also, the strategic interactions chiefly occur at the distribution level. This is not a sine qua non condition for 
community energy projects. 
 
Thus, from our perspective, there is a gap that deserves to be appropriately explored in terms of modelling community energy 
projects and their interactions with other schemes or projects, in order to find clues that may help to answer the research 
questions mentioned above. 
 
2.2 Biform games fundamentals 
 
Community energy projects present a dual behaviour: cooperative on one side, where the members of a community energy 
project need to cooperate with each other in order to carry out the initiative; and non-cooperative on the other, where the 
project itself competes with other projects or schemes of electricity/energy provision. As mentioned above, such dual 
behaviour can be modelled by using hybrid games. Examples of hybrid games and their variety of applications can be found 
in several studies [55-58]. Within the hybrid game theory literature, biform games form a specific category. A biform game 
[17] consists of a hybrid game (cooperative and non-cooperative) that employs the Core (second game stage) and Nash 
equilibrium (first game stage) as solution mechanisms, which are developed under a common methodology. The link between 
both stages is represented by a confidence index, which is derived from the Hurwicz criterion and subsequent modifications 
[17,59,60]. Accordingly, a biform game can be formally defined as follows [17]: 
 




𝑍𝑖 is a finite strategy set for each 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 player 
𝑧𝑖 is the player 𝑖’s selected strategy 
𝑉 is a map from 𝑍𝑖 × … × 𝑍𝑛 to the set of maps 𝛲(𝐼) → ℝ, with 𝑉(𝑧𝑖 , … , 𝑧𝑛)(∅) = 0 for every 𝑧𝑖 , … , 𝑧𝑛 ∈ 𝑍𝑖 × … × 𝑍𝑛.  





The resulting set of strategies 𝑧𝑖 , … , 𝑧𝑛 ∈ 𝑍𝑖 × … × 𝑍𝑛 defines a transferable utility game with characteristic function 
𝑉(𝑧𝑖 , … , 𝑧𝑛):  𝛲(𝐼) → ℝ, where 𝛲(𝐼) is the set of all subsets of the players set 𝐼. This means that, for each coalition 𝑆 ⊆ 𝐼, 
𝑉(𝑧𝑖 , … , 𝑧𝑛)(𝑆) is the value created by coalition 𝑆, given that the players choose the strategies 𝑧𝑖 , … , 𝑧𝑛. Thus, to solve a biform 
game, it is necessary to follow five steps according to Branderburger & Stuart [17]: 
 
a) Determine the Core for the cooperative part or second stage of the (biform) game. 
b) Calculate the range of payoffs for each player. 
c) Use 𝛼𝑖 and (1 − 𝛼𝑖) to compute the weighted average in order to evaluate the cooperative part of the game, applying that 
index to the largest and smallest payoffs that every player could receive. 
d) Assign to player 𝑖 a payoff equal to the 𝑖’s weighted average, in order to reduce the cooperative stage to a non-cooperative 
game. 
e) Compute the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative part or first stage of the game. 
 
Biform games have been applied to a wide range of economic and strategic problems where outcomes are influenced by both 
co-operation and competition [61-70]. In this sense, it is worth highlighting the flexibility that biform games can provide in 
terms of (potential) applications, which might help to deal with different situations where is possible to find cooperation and 
competition at the same time. This is also related to other disciplines such as engineering, as particularly developed in [66]. 
Given this flexibility, biform games allow obtaining deeper knowledge about stability, or how a community-led project can 
incentivise and retain the membership, by giving information about the players’ negotiation power that comes from the 
cooperative stage of each game without considering procedural assumptions of bargaining. In addition, through the non-
cooperative stage, it is possible to get information about whether a strategy is good and creates a favourable cooperative stage 
for players, where they have the chance to negotiate and then obtain the best possible payoff or outcome [17]. All of this might 
help to better understand the emergence of community energy projects, as well as the related cooperation mechanisms and  
competitiveness of such projects, which can be translated into economic-strategic viability. 
 
Biform games take into account the Nash equilibrium as the solution mechanism for the first (non-cooperative) stage, which 
is defined as follows: the strategies (𝑧𝑖
∗, … , 𝑧𝑛
∗ ) are Nash Equilibria if, for each player 𝑖, 𝑧𝑖
∗ is player 𝑖’s best response to the 
strategies (𝑧1
∗, … , 𝑧𝑖−1
∗ , 𝑧𝑖+1
∗  , … , 𝑧𝑛
∗ ) chosen by the other players that solves the following optimisation problem [71]: 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑧𝑖∈𝑍𝑖𝑓𝑖(𝑧1
∗, … , 𝑧𝑖−1
∗ , 𝑧𝑖
∗, 𝑧𝑖+1
∗  , … , 𝑧𝑛
∗ )      (2) 
 
The function payoff, 𝑓𝑖, is given by the cooperative part or second stage of the game. To solve it, biform games take into 
account the Core as the solution mechanism. The Core is defined as follows [72,73]: 
 
𝐶(𝑣) = {𝑥 ∈ ℝ𝑛| ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖∈𝐼 = 𝑣(𝐼) , ∑ 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑣(𝑆)𝑖∈𝑆 ∀ 𝑆 ∈ 𝑃(𝐼)}       (3) 
 
In words, the Core can be defined as a mathematical methodology to distribute payoffs or outcomes among the players, in 
which the sum of all payoffs of each player 𝑖 (∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖∈𝐼 ), who belong to the players set 𝐼 (also referred as grand coalition), has 
to be equal to the coalitional value of 𝐼, 𝑣(𝐼), represented by a characteristic function 𝑣 . This is called the efficiency principle. 
Additionally, the sum of all payoffs of each player 𝑖 who belong to coalition 𝑆 (∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 ), has to be greater than or equal to the 
coalitional value of 𝑆, 𝑣(𝑆). This is called coalitional rationality. This applies to all coalitions that belong to the coalition set 
𝑃(𝐼). Consequently, any payoff allocation or distribution agreement under the Core is stable, in the sense that no player can 
achieve a higher payoff outside a coalition within the Core [73]. Mathematically, the Core can be non-empty (feasible solution) 






Fig. 1. Non-empty and empty Core (adapted from [74]) 
 
Fig. 1 represents a way to plot the Core by drawing a triangle in barycentric coordinates2, in which the plane of the plot is 
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖∈𝐼 = 𝑣(𝐼) and drawing each point on the plane at which the three coordinates sum to 𝑣(𝐼). Then, the coalitional incentives 
constraints are drawn on the plane, in order to find which points are stable or unstable. Moreover, to find games with an 
appropriate and feasible solution, the Core has to meet three mathematical conditions at the same time, according to the 
Bondareva-Shapley theorem: superadditivity, convexity, and balancedness [73-76]. 
 
The link between the first and second stages of the biform game is the parameter 𝛼𝑖, which is the player 𝑖’s confidence index. 
This index can be seen as a representation of the players’ beliefs about the fraction of the coalitional value they could capture 
in the cooperative part of the game. We can therefore obtain information about the degree of competition and potential 
bargaining opportunities. This is why the confidence index is applied to the largest and smallest payoffs that every player could 
receive once the Core is determined. A confidence index near one means an optimistic player who expects to capture most of 
the value to be distributed in the second stage, whereas a confidence index close to zero means the opposite [17].  
 
Recalling that the Core can be non-empty or empty, we also have to deal with games that have an empty Core. Summerfield 
& Dror [18] develop a methodology that treats a biform game as a two-stage stochastic programming problem with recourse, 





∗) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑧𝑖∈{0,1} − 𝑐
1(𝑧𝑖) + 𝑄𝑖(𝑧𝑖 , 𝑧𝑗 , 𝑧𝑘)     (4) 
 
where: 
𝑄𝑖(𝑧𝑖 , 𝑧𝑗 , 𝑧𝑘) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑇⊆{𝑖,𝑗,𝑘} 𝛼𝑖𝑥?̅?
𝑇,(𝑧𝑖,𝑧𝑗,𝑧𝑘) + (1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑥𝑖
𝑇,(𝑧𝑖,𝑧𝑗,𝑧𝑘)    (5) 
𝑠. 𝑡.  
𝐶(𝑇, 𝑣) ≠ ∅        (6) 
 
Here, players 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐼 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘. Furthermore, 𝑇 ⊆ 𝛲(𝐼) represents a stable subcoalition with a non-empty Core (in the 
second stage or cooperative part of the game) that maximises player 𝑖’s expected payoff. That is, a coalitional game Γ = (𝐼, 𝑣) 
will be a subgame Γ = (𝑇, 𝑣) with ∅ ≠ 𝑇 ⊆ 𝛲(𝐼), so 𝑇 can be now also be treated as a coalition. It is important to notice that 
all coalitional values based on 𝑇 are equal to those based on 𝐼. The players’ decisions in the non-cooperative part or first stage 
                                                                




of the game are represented by 𝑧𝑖 ∈ {0, 1}. The term −𝑐
1(𝑧𝑖) denotes a decision cost during the first stage, derived from the 
second stage symbolised by 𝑄𝑖(𝑧𝑖 , 𝑧𝑗 , 𝑧𝑘). 𝑥?̅? and 𝑥𝑖 represent the upper and lower payments, respectively, that a particular 
player could receive. We consider this approach for games with an empty Core.  
 




In this section, a specific application of biform games to the community energy sector is formulated to better understand this 
phenomenon from an economic-strategic perspective. Bearing in mind the concepts shown above, the assumptions for this 
applied model are as follows. 
 
We consider two residential electricity customers, who have the option to participate in energy production using solar 
photovoltaic (PV) technology in one of following two ways:  
 
a) The first way to do so is through a net billing (or distributed generation) scheme, jointly carried out with a distributor or 
supplier as is usual in several countries (including Chile and the UK), in which customers can individually buy (rooftop) solar 
PV panels and the energy injection to the grid is valued at an injection rate that is different from the consumption rate. The 
resulting monetary value is then subtracted from the energy consumption expenses [12]. Accordingly, this type of project can 
be catalogued under the Ackermann et al.’s [15] definition, which defines distributed generation as “an electric power source 
connected directly to the distribution network or on the customer site of the meter”. 
 
b) The other way is having an agreement only between both residential electricity customers to build and set up a small-scale 
solar PV power plant, which is conceived to satisfy their electricity consumption. We consider the case of implementing an 
initiative for self-consumption only for simplicity. Accordingly, this project can be catalogued under the Fuentes González et 
al.’s [12] definition, which defines community energy projects as “projects conceived, carried out, and implemented by people 
who are: 
 
 Interested in generating energy 
 Located close to or in the exact place of the project 
 Well-organised under any suitable legal and organisational structure 
 The owner, or have a high participation in the ownership, of the project 
 The main (and/or the first) beneficiary of the project 
 Primarily interested in welfare maximisation and income generation.” 
 
It is important to note that the same authors notice that community energy projects are more complex than distributed 
generation ones, in terms of their nature and characteristics, because the former do not need to be connected to distribution 
networks, can involve more than one customer at the same time, and imply not only technical aspects, but also social and 
economic ones [12]. 
 
On the other hand, if the residential electricity customers decide not to participate in energy production, they can maintain a 





Hence, these three modalities of participation in the electricity market constitute the three scenarios taken into account in our 
games: distributed generation scenario, community energy scenario, and base scenario, respectively. We then assume that all 
players perfectly know the costs, tariffs, rights, and obligations derived from their relations with other players in these three 
scenarios.  
 
We model the aforementioned situation as three-player (coalitional) games with transferable utility. The cooperation 
agreements are negotiated by the players and can be enforced by some outside party, if necessary. The games can then be 
defined as follows: 
 




Γ = a three-player (coalitional) cooperative game. 
𝐼 = {1,2,3} = the players set or grand coalition; 
𝑣 = a function 𝛲(𝐼) → ℝ, with 𝑣(∅) = 0, which indicates the maximal aggregate payoff of a coalition 𝑆 ∈ 𝛲(𝐼); 
𝛲(𝐼) = set of coalitions (i.e., the set of all subsets of 𝐼). Additionally, 𝐼, ∅, and the single player sets {𝑖} (with 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼), are treated 
as coalitions. Any payoff vector for 𝑛 players is denoted as 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2 … 𝑥𝑛) ∈ ℝ
𝑛. 
 
We therefore examine the three scenarios for each country (Scotland and Chile), as noted below in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Details of scenarios developed in each country 
Relation / Scenario Base scenario Distributed generation scenario Community energy scenario 
Players involved 
Player 1 & Player 3 
Player 2 & Player 3   
Player 1 & Player 3 
Player 2 & Player 3   
Player 1 & Player 2 
Type of relation or 
agreement 
Utility contract Net billing scheme 
Project through a legal organisation 
for self-consumption 
Coalitions {1, 3}, {2, 3} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2} 
 
3.2 Key definitions and assumptions for payments and coalitional values 
 
To determine the payments for each player and the corresponding coalitional values3, we formulate the following equations: 
 
a) Annual customers’ electricity consumption payments at present value, 𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑉𝐶. 
 
𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑉𝐶 =  [(𝐷𝑡𝐶 × 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶) 𝑟⁄ ][1 − 1 (1 + 𝑟)
𝑡⁄ ]  (USD/year)    (8) 
 
b) Annual distributor’s/supplier’s requirements payments at present value, 𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑉𝐷. 
 
𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑉𝐷 =  𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑉𝐶  (1 − 𝜔) (USD/year)     (9) 
 
c) Annual generation payment obtained by customers at present value, 𝐴𝐺𝑃𝑉𝐶. 
 
𝐴𝐺𝑃𝑉𝐶 =  [(𝐺𝑇𝐶 × 𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐶) 𝑟⁄ ][1 − 1 (1 + 𝑟)
𝑡⁄ ] (USD/year)    (10) 
 
 
                                                                






𝐷𝑡𝐶= Distribution or supply tariff paid by customers. 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶= Customers’ annual average consumption. 
𝐺𝑇𝐶 = Generation tariff received by customers. 
𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐶 = Customers’ annual average generation. 
𝜔  = Added value generated and captured by the distributor/supplier, between 0 and 1. 
𝑟 = Discount rate. 
𝑡 = Period of time, in years. 
 
Regarding the parameter 𝐷𝑡𝐶, we take into consideration representative tariffs from one of the main distributors/suppliers in 
each country, as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Representative electricity tariffs assigned to customers in Chile4 and Scotland5 
Data / Country Chile Scotland Unit 
Chilean Tariff 90.71  CLP/kWh 
British Tariff  14.03 p/kWh 
Tariffs in USD 0.15 0.19 USD/kWh 
Sources: [77,78] 
 
The term 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 is defined according to the following criteria: 
 
a) For player 1, we assume this player consumes 1,800 kWh/year in Chile [79] and 3,505 kWh/year in the UK [80], as we 
recognise this player as a residential low-middle income consumer of electricity. 
b) For player 2, we assume this player consumes 7,865 kWh/year in Chile [79] and 4,972 kWh/year in the UK [80], as we 
recognise this player as a residential high income consumer of electricity. 
c) It is important to notice that player 3 is a distributor (in Chile) or supplier (in Scotland) of electricity. 
 
Concerning the term 𝐺𝑇𝐶, we consider that players 1 and 2 have access to a sale (generation) rate of 0.10 USD/kWh [78] and 
0.05 USD/kWh [81] in Chile and Scotland, respectively. 
 
We parameterise 𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐶 considering information about the potential generation of solar PV panels in Chile and Scotland. For 
the Scottish case, we take data from the Energy Saving Trust’s Solar Energy Calculator considering as the consumer’s location 
the city of Edinburgh, a roof slope of 45°, a shading less than 20% of the sky, with a southeast direction of the roof, and a 
medium installation size. The potential generation derived from the use of solar PV panels and corresponding costs are shown 
in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Potential generation derived from solar PV panels use and the related costs in Chile and Scotland 
Criteria / Country Chile Scotland 
Main location Santiago Edinburgh 
Installed capacity 2 kWp 2 kWp 
Potential annual generation 3,000 kWh 1,520 kWh 
Cost (Local currency) CLP 3,390,000 GBP 4,000 
Solar PV Cost (USD) 5,471.27 5,277.05 
Sources: [82,83] 
 
                                                                
4 Valid at September 2017, considering the BT1 tariff including energy, capacity buying, distribution capacity, pool coordination and transmission use. 
5 Valid at September 2017, considering a simple average of all locations of British Gas Standard domestic single rate electricity for Direct Debit payment, with 




In order to determine the overnight capital cost 𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑, and then estimate the cost per household of a solar PV power 
plant in a community energy project which meets the capital requirements, we consider an 𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 of 2,020 USD/kW 
and a capacity factor of 0.2 [84]. Moreover, we take the number of residential electricity customers of one municipality/council 
in each country, where we can find similar features for both residential customers. The selected places are Lo Barnechea for 
Chile, and The City of Edinburgh Council for Scotland, which have 364,868 customers [85] and 241,433 customers [86], 
respectively. In the Scottish case, it is important to note that we assume that each separate dwelling is a separate residential 
electricity customer. Furthermore, for practical purposes, and because it would be unrealistic to think that everyone could 
participate in this kind of initiative at the same time in a certain place, we just take a small proportion of those customers 
(0.1%) as potential participants. We assume that a half of them are low-middle income customers (player 1) and the rest are 




Overnight Capital Cost (OCC) per household 
Item / Specific Location Lo Barnechea Municipality City of Edinburgh Council Unit 
Selected customers 365 241  
Customers as player 1 182 121  
Customers as player 2 182 121  
Consumption player 1 328,381 423,111 kWh/yr 
Consumption player 2 1,434,843 600,202 kWh/yr 
Required capacity player 1 187 242 kW 
Required capacity player 2 819 343 kW 
Total required capacity 1,006 584 kW 
OCC player 1 378,613 487,834 USD 
OCC player 2 1,654,329 692,014 USD 
𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 player 1 2,075 4,041 USD 
𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 player 2 9,068 5,733 USD 
 
The term 𝜔 is quantified by considering information from distributor’s financial statements from 2012 to 2016, in order to 
have a representative measure of the value generated and captured by player 3, after receiving payments from players 1 and 2, 
and paying player 3’s suppliers. We set 𝜔 to the average operating margin, defined as operating profit divided by revenues 
due to the core activities; 13% [87] and 5% [88] for the Chilean and Scottish case, respectively.  
 
We use a discount rate 𝑟 =10% and consider a 25-year horizon, which is the approximate useful life of solar PV panels [89]. 
Using these parameters, we bring all financial payments to their present value assuming a uniform time horizon. 
 




Formulas to compute the payments for each player in every scenario 
 Base scenario Distributed generation scenario Community energy scenario 
Player 1 (8) (10) − [(8) + Solar PV Cost] (8) − 𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
Player 2 (8) (10) − [(8) + Solar PV Cost] (8) − 𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
Player 3 (8) − (9) 
Chilean case: [(8) − (10) + Solar PV Cost] −
{[((8) − (10)) × (1 − 𝜔)] +
[(Solar PV Cost) × (1-30%)]} 
 
Scottish case: [(8) − (10)] − {[((8) − (10)) ×
(1 − 𝜔)]}  
0 
 
Table 5 lists the nature of all payments for each player, under the three scenarios described above. Accordingly, the payments 
under the base scenario represent how much players 1 and 2 pay for their electricity consumption to the distributor or supplier, 
which is simultaneously the amount that the latter receives, minus the corresponding costs based on the specified profit. The 
payments under the distributed generation scenario represent how much players 1 and 2 receive for the energy production from 




receives payments for the residential customers’ consumption, minus their solar PV generation, and the corresponding costs 
based on a specific margin. It is worth nothing that, in Chile, players 1 and 2 can buy solar PV panels from distribution 
companies (we assume that the distributor’s profit margin on solar panel sales is 30%) and specialised vendors, unlike in 
Scotland, where customers can only buy them from specialized vendors6. These differences are reflected in the corresponding 
formulas. The payments for the community energy scenario imply that players 1 and 2 receive the savings derived from their 
reduction in electricity consumption payments to the supplier or, alternatively, that the community-led project receives 
electricity payments, minus a lump-sum cost per player or household which represents their share in the project. 
 
Assuming that the costs of solar PV panels and OCC are covered in just one instalment, we calculate the payments for each 
player, scenario, and country, taking into account all equations from Table 5, as shown in Tables 6 and 7. 
 
Table 6  Table 7 
Payments received by every player and scenario in the Chilean case 
(amounts in USD)  
Payments received by every player and scenario in the Scottish case 
(amounts in USD) 





















































s 1 - 689.86 6,044.85 
2 - 2,723.11 10,708.64 
 
2 - 689.86 8,574.90 
3 13,159.44 18,655.75 - 
 













































































s 1 - - 2,003.70 
2 - - 1,640.54 
 
2 - - 2,842.34 
3 1,710.73 4,285.48 - 
 
3 730.99 662 - 
 
Because the Core is considered within the concept of biform games, we clip all negative payments to zero. We therefore define 
all coalitions and their values, considering the data shown in Tables 6 and 7, in order to compute and solve the games presented 
in Tables 8 and 9, as shown below. 
 
Table 8 
Game 1 - Coalitions and their values for each scenario in the Chilean case (amounts in thousands of USD, which come from Table 6) 
Coalitions / scenarios 





Community energy scenario 
{∅} 0    
{1} 0    
{2} 0    
{3} 0    
{1, 2}    2.02 
{1, 3}  0.32   
{2, 3}  1.39   
{1, 2, 3}   4.29  
 
Table 9 
Game 2 - Coalitions and their values for each scenario in the Scottish case (amounts in thousands of USD, which come from Table 7) 
Coalitions / scenarios 





Community energy scenario 
{∅} 0    
{1} 0    
{2} 0    
{3} 0    
{1, 2}    4.85 
{1, 3}  0.30   
{2, 3}  0.43   
{1, 2, 3}   0.66  
 
                                                                
6 The cost of solar PV panels is taken as an average of the values listed in http://www.theecoexperts.co.uk/how-much-do-solar-panels-cost-uk#/3 for devices of 2 




In these two tables, the sum of the values associated to coalitions {1, 3} and {2, 3} are equal to the final payment for player 3 
in the base scenario in Tables 6 and 7. There are two terms in that sum, which correspond to player 1’s and player 2’s value 
under coalition with player 3 separately, according to the nature of the base scenario. 
 
As a sensitivity analysis, we now modify the values in Tables 8 and 9 to clearly see the effects of cost subsidisation on the 
confidence indexes and Nash equilibria. For simplicity, we consider a support scheme in which solar PV panel costs and OCC 
are covered by annualised payments, mostly made by a subsidising entity, such as a government. Specifically, we consider a 
case in which consumers make only one payment in the first year of the project, after which the government pays the rest7. 
This implies that the payments series occur during the solar PV panels useful life mentioned before. In relation to the distributed 
generation scenario, we also now consider that solar PV panels are bought from specialised vendors in both countries. This 
means that, for the Chilean case, consumers can buy solar PV panels at a 50% lower cost.  
 
The games and their corresponding coalitional values for this sensitivity analysis are shown in Tables 10 and 11. 
 
Table 10 
Game 3 - Coalitions and their values for each scenario in the Chilean case (amounts in thousands of USD) 
Coalitions / scenarios 





Community energy scenario 
{∅} 0    
{1} 0    
{2} 0    
{3} 0    
{1, 2}    11.93 
{1, 3}  0.32   
{2, 3}  1.39   
{1, 2, 3}   1.00  
 
Table 11 
Game 4 - Coalitions and their values for each scenario in the Scottish case (amounts in thousands of USD) 
Coalitions / scenarios 





Community energy scenario 
{∅} 0    
{1} 0    
{2} 0    
{3} 0    
{1, 2}    13.54 
{1, 3}  0.30   
{2, 3}  0.43   
{1, 2, 3}   0.66  
 
In Tables 10 and 11, as before, the sum of the values associated to coalitions {1, 3} and {2, 3} are equal to the final payment 
for player 3 in the base scenario. 
 
3.3 Procedural considerations 
 
In all these three-player games there are two components of decisions: a non-cooperative and a cooperative one. The non-
cooperative component represents an individual decision to get involved in an electricity generation project or simply buy 
electricity through a standard supply agreement. The cooperative component represents the possible payoffs and their 
distribution among the players who have decided to become involved in energy production. This involves negotiation power 
implications, as mentioned before. Consequently, given that we need to calculate the Core to solve the cooperative part of each 
game, we consider a triangle with barycentric coordinates, following the next inequality: 
 
𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}) − 𝑥𝑘 ≥  𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗})      (11) 
𝑥𝑘 ≤ 𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}) − 𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗})      (12) 
                                                                









𝐶(𝑣) = {𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 , 𝑥𝑘 ∈ ℝ
3: 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗 + 𝑥𝑘 = 𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}), 𝑣({𝑖}) ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤  𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}) − 𝑣({𝑗, 𝑘}), 𝑣({𝑗}) ≤ 𝑥𝑗
≤  𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}) − 𝑣({𝑖, 𝑘}), 
𝑣({𝑘}) ≤ 𝑥𝑘 ≤  𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘}) − 𝑣({𝑖, 𝑗})}      (13) 
 
Apart from the considerations related to the calculation of the Core, it is important to verify whether the Core is non-empty or 
empty. To do so, we take into account the following inequalities which have to be met at the same time, according to the 




𝑣({1}) + 𝑣({2}) ≤ 𝑣({1,2})       (14) 
𝑣({1}) + 𝑣({3}) ≤ 𝑣({1,3})       (15) 
𝑣({2}) + 𝑣({3}) ≤ 𝑣({2,3})        (16) 
𝑣({1}) + 𝑣({2,3}) ≤ 𝑣({1,2,3})      (17) 
𝑣({2}) + 𝑣({1,3}) ≤ 𝑣({1,2,3})      (18) 




𝑣({1,2}) + 𝑣({1,3}) ≤ 𝑣({1,2,3}) + 𝑣({1})     (20) 
𝑣({1,2}) + 𝑣({2,3}) ≤ 𝑣({1,2,3}) + 𝑣({2})     (21) 




𝑣({1,2}) + 𝑣({1,3}) + 𝑣({2,3}) ≤ 2𝑣({1,2,3})     (23) 
 
In games with an empty Core, Summerfield & Dror’s [18] approach is considered as described above. Recalling that the 
players’ decisions in the first stage of the game are represented by 𝑧𝑖 ∈ {0, 1}, we assume for simplicity that the decision cost 
during the first stage is −𝑐1(𝑧𝑖) = 0; this could easily be generalised to include first-stage decision costs. In terms of the upper 
and lower payments 𝑥?̅? and 𝑥𝑖, since 𝑥?̅? and 𝑥𝑖 ∈ ℝ
𝑛 and we assume transferable utility games, then 𝛼𝑖𝑥?̅? + (1 − 𝛼𝑖)𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖. 
This implies that 𝑥?̅? and 𝑥𝑖 represent player 𝑖’s income and costs, respectively, which form the coalitional values listed above. 
Accordingly, player 𝑖 is confident about the influence that incomes or expenses might have on the final payoff. This will allow 
determining the upper and lower bounds that are necessary to use the confidence indexes, even when there is an empty Core 
and the grand coalition may form. Considering this, we solve (4), (5), and (6). 
 
Another aspect is that, in reality, players might not have perfect information about each other’s confidence indexes; hence, 
they might not know which coalitions the other players prefer. We therefore propose an alternative approach that combines 




confidence index (𝛼𝑖) follows a uniform distribution. This implies that each degree of confidence about the final payoff has 
the same probability, because none of the players knows anything about other players’ confidence. We determine the Nash 
equilibrium (best strategy, coalition, and final payoff) for each player, randomly sampling 10,000 points from each distribution 
by solving (4), (5) and (6). This will help to better understand which project (coalition) prevails when players do not know the 
other players’ confidence indexes. Furthermore, this will give an idea about the likelihood of coalition formation. To track the 
final results, we model a matrix that is shown in Fig. 2. In this matrix, player 1 chooses the rows, player 2 chooses the columns, 
and player 3 chooses the matrices. 
 
 {∅} {2}  {3} {2, 3} 
 𝑧2 = 0 𝑧2 = 1  𝑧2 = 0 𝑧2 = 1 
𝑧1 = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑖 
𝑧1 = 1 0 0 0 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑖 0  𝑥𝑖 0 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑖 
 𝑧3 = 0  𝑧3 = 1 
 {1} {1, 2}  {1, 3} {1, 2, 3} 




We first verify whether our games have a non-empty Core, by computing inequalities (14) to (23). The findings of this 
procedure are shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12 
Test results for Superadditivity, Convexity, and Balancedness for every game 
Games / Criterion Superadditivity Convexity Balancedness Type of Core 
Game 1 – Chilean case Yes Yes Yes Non-empty 
Game 2 – Scottish case Yes No No Empty 
Game 3 – Chilean case with cost subsidisation Yes No No Empty 
Game 4 – Scottish case with cost subsidisation Yes No No Empty 
 
As can be seen above, only game 1 has a non-empty Core. We follow Branderburger & Stuart’s [17] method to solve this 
game. For the rest of the games, we follow Summerfield & Dror’s [18] approach as explained above. 
 
4.1 Numerical results for game 1 
 
Taking into account (3) and solving (11) to (13), we determine the Core for this game considering constraints (24) to (28), 
which are based on the coalitional values listed in Table 8, in order to comply with the coalitional rationality criterion and 
efficiency principle: 
 
𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 ≥ 0       (24) 
𝑥1 + 𝑥2 ≥ 2.02       (25) 
𝑥1 + 𝑥3 ≥ 0.32       (26) 
𝑥2 + 𝑥3 ≥ 1.39       (27) 
𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3 = 4.29      (28) 
 
We therefore plot a triangle with barycentric coordinates as can be seen in Fig. 3, which shows the possible imputations that 






Fig. 3. Non-empty Core for Game 1 (amounts in thousands of USD) 
 
These results are not straightforward. If players 1 and 2 block any participation (and payoff) for player 3 and decide to form 
coalition {1,2}, the worst acceptable payoff for them will be 0.32 and 1.39, respectively. Clearly, player 3 will have the 
incentive to participate in another coalition, as he receives zero. In the case of being involved in another coalition, the worst 
acceptable payoff for players 1 and 2 will be zero. Similarly, the best acceptable payoff for players 1 and 2 will be same in 
either coalition {1,2} or a different one. Hence, assigning a conservative confidence index for each player, which means that 
each player has a neutral payoff expectation, we determine the Nash equilibrium taking the payoffs shown in Fig.3 and solving 
(2), as noted in Table 13. 
 
Table 13 
Final results for Game 1 (rounded amounts in thousands of USD taken from Fig. 3.) 
Strategies / Players 
Player's possible payoffs Player's confidence - 𝛼𝑖 Best strategy 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Best payoff forming {1,2} 2.9 4.0 0.0 
0.5 0.5 0.5 {1,2} {1,2} ≠ {1,2} 
Worst Payoff forming {1,2} 0.3 1.4 0.0 
Best payoff forming another 
coalition 
2.9 4.0 2.3 
Worst Payoff forming another 
coalition 
0.0 0.0 0.3 
 
Forming coalition {1,2} implies that the strategy of being a consumer and/or producer of electricity by implementing a 
community energy project (CEP) is optimal, so we can say that the rest of the possible coalitions follow other options (No 







Fig. 4. Nash equilibrium for Game 1 (amounts in thousands of USD) 
 
In Fig. 4, player 1 chooses the rows, player 2 chooses the columns, and player 3 chooses the matrices. It is important to notice 
that even when the confidence index changes for all players, the resulting Nash equilibrium will be the same in this case. 
 
4.2 Numerical results for games 2, 3, 4, and simulation 
 
4.2.1 Games 2, 3, and 4 
 
We solve (4), (5), and (6), and modify each confidence index, one at a time, in order to determine the possible Nash equilibria 
given the specific confidence indexes. The findings are shown in Tables 14, 15, and 16. 
 
Table 14 
Game 2 - Intervals for players’ confidence and corresponding Nash Equilibrium 
Players’ confidence Nash Equilibrium 
0.401 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 1 
0.401 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 1 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 0.487 
Community energy scenario 
0.943 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 1.000 
0.953 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 1.000 
0.488 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Distributed generation scenario 
𝛼1 = 1.000 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 0.952 
0.488 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Base scenario {1,3} 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 0.942 
𝛼2 = 1.000 
0.488 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Base scenario {2,3} 
 
Table 15 
Game 3 - Intervals for players’ confidence and corresponding Nash Equilibrium 
Players’ confidence Nash Equilibrium 
0.086 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 1 
0.086 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 1 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 0.465 
Community energy scenario 
0.503 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 1.000 
0.802 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 1.000 
0.466 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Distributed generation scenario 
𝛼1 = 1.000 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 0.801 
0.466 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Base scenario {1,3} 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 0.502 
𝛼2 = 1.000 
0.466 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Base scenario {2,3} 
  
CEP 1.6 2.7 0.0 1.6 2.0 0.0 CEP 1.6 2.7 1.3 1.6 2.0 1.3




Player 2 Player 2






Game 4 - Intervals for players’ confidence and corresponding Nash Equilibrium 
Players’ confidence Nash Equilibrium 
0.069 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 1 
0.069 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 1 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 0.487 
Community energy scenario 
0.906 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 1.000 
0.930 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 1.000 
0.488 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Distributed generation scenario 
𝛼1 = 1.000 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 0.929 
0.488 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Base scenario {1,3} 
0.000 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 0.905 
𝛼2 = 1.000 
0.488 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000 
Base scenario {2,3} 
 
Given that coalitions {1}, {2}, {3}, and the empty coalition {∅} have the same coalitional values (equal to zero), we assume an 
empty solution for the first stage, namely, the decisions  𝑧1 = 𝑧2 = 𝑧3 = 0 or {∅}, if the Nash equilibrium is one of these 
coalitions. It is also clear that if the players’ confidence indexes do not meet one of the intervals, the solution will be 𝑧1 =




As explained above, we also simulate uncertainty about confidence indexes by considering 10,000 solutions to (4), (5), and 
(6), randomly and independently drawing confidence indexes from uniform distributions with support [0,1]. We then obtain 
the percentage of specific Nash equilibria (strategies/coalitions) out of the total number of cases/iterations, which are shown 
in Table 17. 
 
Table 17 
Nash Equilibria as a percentage out of the total number of iterations. 
Strategies or coalitions / Games Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 
No relation among the players - {∅}  82.74% 56.27% 56.89% 
Community energy scenario 17.08% 38.63% 42.69% 
Distributed generation scenario 0.18% 5.10% 0.42% 
 
According to Table 17, even when there is no knowledge among the players about people’s confidence, there is an opportunity 
for implementing community energy projects in both countries, considering games 2, 3, and 4.  
 
We also determine the minimum thresholds necessary for obtaining a particular coalition as solution, in terms of payments 
(𝑥𝑖) and confidence indexes for each player and game. These are presented in Table 18, and although they are naturally 
sensitive to the sample size, they do show that even relatively low confidence levels can be enough for a community energy 






Minimum threshold observed in 10,000 iterations, in terms of 𝑥𝑖 and 𝛼𝑖 (rounded 









𝑥𝑖 = 2.55 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.401 
1 − 𝛼𝑖 = 0.599 
 
𝑥𝑖 = 0.08 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.086 
1 − 𝛼𝑖 = 0.914 
 
 
𝑥𝑖 = 4.6 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.069 




𝑥𝑖 = 7.10 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.401 
1 − 𝛼𝑖 = 0.599 
 
𝑥𝑖 = 8.57 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.086 
1 − 𝛼𝑖 = 0.914 
𝑥𝑖 = 1.19 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.069 






𝑥𝑖 = 28.18 
𝛼𝑖 =  0.945 
1 − 𝛼𝑖 = 0.055 
 
 
𝑥𝑖 = 1.59 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.503 
1 − 𝛼𝑖 = 0.497 
 
 
𝑥𝑖 = 6.41 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.907 




𝑥𝑖 = 3.75 
𝛼𝑖 =  0.953 
1 − 𝛼𝑖 = 0.047 
 
 
𝑥𝑖 = 3.9 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.802 
1 − 𝛼𝑖 = 0.198 
 
 
𝑥𝑖 = 7.45 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.931 




𝑥𝑖 = 2045.93 
𝛼𝑖 =  0.566 
1 − 𝛼𝑖 = 0.434 
 
𝑥𝑖 = 16.93 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.466 
1 − 𝛼𝑖 = 0.534 
𝑥𝑖 = 58.77 
𝛼𝑖 = 0.489 
1 − 𝛼𝑖 = 0.511 
 
5. Discussion and recommendations  
 
5.1 Discussion of the games and their results 
 
In relation to game 1 (Chilean case shown in Fig. 3, Table 13, and Fig. 4), it is important to note that this game has a non-
empty Core and no cost subsidisation is considered. Based on the results above, player 1 (the low-medium income residential 
customer) and player 2 (the high income residential customer) will form a coalition in order to carry out a community energy 
project, which is represented by coalition {1,2}. This strategy is the most profitable for them, under our assumptions. Player 3 
(the electricity distributor) would not be interested in participating in such coalition {1,2}, as it might be offered a payment 
equal to zero (and then blocked to do so). If the distributor were offered a better payoff/payment, e.g., 𝑥3 = 1.43 (with a Core 
𝐶(𝑣) = {𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3 ∈ ℝ
3: 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3 = 4.29, 𝑥1 =  1.43, 𝑥2 = 1.43, 𝑥3 = 1.43}), such payoff distribution would not be 
preferred by both residential electricity customers, as there is another (better) option for them. Consequently, this would 
motivate blocking measures and then the community energy coalition formation, leaving the distributor aside.  
 
In game 2 (Scottish case shown in Tables 14, 17, and 18), no costs subsidisation is considered and it has an empty Core, so we 
adopt Summerfield & Dror’s [18] solution approach. Here, the community energy coalition requires a lower income to cover 
the costs, as the minimum required confidence indexes to form coalition {1,2} is relatively low (𝛼𝑖 ≥ 0.401). Hence, as long 
as both residential electricity customers have that level of confidence and the supplier is slightly pessimistic about the results 
of the game or negotiation process (0 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 0.487), the best strategy (represented by the Nash equilibrium) for all players 
will be the implementation of a community energy project. On the other hand, if the supplier is more confident about the results 
of the negotiation process (0.487 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 1.000) and both residential electricity customers are also more confident about the 
results, leaving the uncertainty aside, the best strategy will be the implementation of a net billing project. This might be also 
interpreted as follows: the less uncertainty (alternatively, the more confidence) you have, the more attractive the traditional 
electricity provision scheme is. This can be seen in all games, especially when a regular utility contract is the best strategy for 
all players (coalitions {1,3} and {2,3} in Table 14). Here, there is no uncertainty for both residential customers because they 
have to pay their bill every month, which is received by the supplier. At the same time, due to both residential electricity 




that it can extract this revenue. The results of our probabilistic analysis also show that there are opportunities for community 
energy initiatives, as shown in Table 17. The successful cases in which the best strategy for all players is the implementation 
of community energy projects reached 17.08%, a percentage that is higher that of distributed generation projects (0.18%). As 
it happens, community energy initiatives are relatively popular in Scotland, compared to other types of citizen participation, 
so although our model is simple, it does go some way in explaining reality.  
 
Considering games 3 and 4 (Chilean and Scottish case, respectively), both games present an empty Core but in these cases, a 
cost subsidy is considered. As can be seen in Table 15 (Chilean case), the required confidence for implementing community 
energy projects (represented by coalition {1,2}) reaches a very low level for both residential customers (𝛼𝑖 ≥ 0.086). At the 
same time, the distributor may be pessimistic about the results of the game or negotiation process (0 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 0.465) but there 
would be a favourable environment for conceiving community-led projects, as the best strategy for all players is forming 
coalition {1,2}. The same feature can be seen in Table 16 (Scottish case), where the required confidence for forming coalition 
{1,2} is also very low for both residential consumers (𝛼𝑖 ≥ 0.069) and, again, the supplier may be pessimistic about how well 
he can perform within the bargaining process (0 ≤ 𝛼3 ≤ 0.487) but the best strategy for all incumbents will be carrying out a 
community energy project. In this sense, according to all possible solutions of these 2 games, including those solutions where 
having a regular utility contract (represented by coalitions {1,3} and {2,3} in Tables 15 and 16) is the best strategy, we notice 
that the less uncertainty (alternatively, the more confidence) one has, the more traditional the electricity provision scheme is 
preferred. From our probabilistic results shown in Table 17, we can see a remarkable percentage of community energy 
equilibria (38.63% and 42.69% for the Chilean and Scottish case, respectively), in comparison with distributed generation 
strategies (5.10% and 0.42% for the Chilean and Scottish case, respectively). This is not entirely surprising, as the costs of 
community energy have been decreased significantly.   
 
Comparatively speaking, the confidence index for each scenario and player in games 2 and 4, which are presented in Tables 
14 and 16 for the Scottish case, is influenced by a cost subsidisation under the community energy scenario. This effect implies 
a significant reduction on the required confidence index for both residential customers, in order to have a community energy 
initiative as solution (from 0.401 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 ≤ 1 to 0.069 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 ≤ 1 for both players). In relation to the distributed generation 
scenario, there is also a reduction in the required confidence index for the same incumbents, but by a lower amount (from 
0.943 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 1 and 0.953 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 1 to 0.503 ≤ 𝛼1 ≤ 1 and 0.802 ≤ 𝛼2 ≤ 1, respectively). Although those significant 
reductions in the confidence indexes came from one scenario (community energy), the possible equilibria in the game were 
altered. This is interesting because a modification of costs structures affects the possible equilibria, and therefore the 
probability of a specific coalition forming. This can be noted in our simulation (shown in Table 17) where a cost subsidisation 
is considered. For example, in the Scottish case, the successful cases in which implementing community energy projects was 
the best strategy for all players increased from 17.08% in game 2 to 42.69% in game 4. We also notice that the likelihood of 
having a net billing schemes as a solution is almost zero (0.42%), which is consistent with the current market context.  
 
5.2 General remarks and recommendations 
 
Taking into account all of the above, recalling the research questions revealed before, we note some important elements. First, 
an appropriate payoff distribution between both residential customers can assure stability and, therefore, long-lasting coalition 
formation, as no attractive option would influence any change in the coalition or project. Second, the negotiation between both 
residential consumers will be especially crucial, given that without a successful bargaining process the emergence of the 
community energy project (coalition formation) might not occur. Third, the interaction between the residential customers’ 
negotiation power and that of the distributor/supplier is critical because both residential consumers should be able to operate 
and run the business without any involvement from the distributor/supplier. This seems contradictory in the current context 




to imply that our results suggest a total exclusion of distributors, but rather suggest that they may be better placed in other 
supporting roles for community energy projects, such as ancillary services for small-scale projects. Thus, the regulatory 
environment should favour market freedom and free access to other (potential) incumbents, namely, community energy 
projects, promoting equality in terms of negotiation and avoiding any market power exercise. Nevertheless, it is also true that 
promoting more flexibility and adaptability for distributors/suppliers will be necessary in case of a wider deployment of 
community energy projects, as this would potentially reduce their market share. Fourth, one of the most crucial assumptions 
we make is that residential customers can afford any level of costs, which is particularly important for games 1 and 2. This 
might not be true unless customers have access to a saving scheme or direct subsidies before entering the business, or simply 
have the money to do so. More work is needed to explore the impacts of credit constraints and policies to alleviate these. 
Finally, there are other factors that are not considered in this paper; for example, the specific terms and conditions for public 
or private funding, how establishing PPAs or other contracts would affect the economic-strategic viability, and other costs that 
might be relevant (design & engineering, system infrastructure - metering, lines, and other equipment -, legal, first buyer, 
operational, marketing, and so on). We also do not consider carbon reduction incentives. Our approach based on biform games 
could take these into account. For instance, PPAs, which represent a higher income for community energy initiatives in case 
of having electricity (surpluses) to export through the grid, would move the conclusions towards more stability and higher 
economic-strategic viability for community energy initiatives. Carbon incentives would work in the same way. On the contrary, 
considering other costs would move the conclusions in the opposite direction. Given that each project or scheme has its own 
particularities and complexities, we consider a comparative base in terms of income and costs as realistic and uniform as 
possible. This is why, for example, solar PV retail investment costs and overnight costs are considered for the net billing 
scheme and community energy project, respectively. By taking these costs into account, we can better represent payoffs so 
that the decision can be seen as a decision on the implementation of turnkey projects with a comparative base. Therefore, any 
additional cost can be added without reducing model transparency and increasing computational cost. Further research can 
deal with this situation, for instance, through the combination of more advanced optimisation models and biform games that 
consider other costs. Based on the above, we can say that our results show consistency with the current situation in Scotland 
and Chile, where community energy projects have been promoted in the former and net billing projects in the latter, even when 
that is not necessarily optimal for residential customers in Chile [12]. This means that, from an economic-strategic perspective 
considering our mild assumptions, community energy projects can be a viable and competitive option to produce energy for 
residential customers, which addresses the research questions listed above. 
 
Our findings are also aligned with a variety of empirical studies. For instance, Walker [26] states that “local income and 
regeneration” is one of the key incentives for community ownership. Based on a survey, Seyfang et al. [25] notice that the 
economic objectives are one of the most important aspects for UK community energy groups. For a group of case studies, 
Hicks & Ison [22] note that “financial benefits for shareholders and/or community” is a leading motivation. Ebers Broughel 
& Hampl [37] based on two large-scale representative surveys performed in Austria and Switzerland, show the existence of 
potential investors who are willing to invest between 1,000 and 10,000 CHF/EUR in community energy projects. Brummer 
[24] highlights that “economic benefits” is one of the most cited categories for a set of UK-based investigations. On the other 
hand, for the same set of studies notices that the most cited barrier is “lack of resources” (funding, time, and expertise). Nolden 
[43] shows the challenges for gathering financial resources. As noted above, the specific terms and conditions of private and/or 
public funding are not accounted in our approach. Berka et al. [46] notice that community energy projects face higher costs, 
longer project development times, and higher risks, which is influenced by six facets of an organisation or project. None of 
these six facets are accounted in our approach. Abada et al. [47] establish that even when it is possible a value creation by 
community-led coalitions, there is no guarantee that they are viable, as some members would exit the project or coalition. 
Again, there are several factors that play a role in this case: firstly, as mentioned beforehand, this study considers a project that 
would be more related to the definition of distributed generation shown above. Secondly, there are also other game theory 





All the above does not necessarily mean that our results have to be strictly aligned to other trends in other markets, as there 
are other factors that may have not been taken into account in our games, as shown above. For example, costs, other empirical 
or legal definitions of projects, technologies and energy sources availability, among others, may influence our results and their 
alignment to other trends in energy markets. More research could address this. 
 
Another key element is the role of the confidence index and its practical meaning. As shown before, this index reflects players’ 
confidence on how well they could do within the game, i.e., how large a fraction of the coalitional value they could capture. 
For games with an empty Core, we adapt this so that the confidence index reflects players’ expectations on the influence that 
changes in revenues or expenses might have on the final payoff. With this slight modification, we determined the upper and 
lower payoff bounds, applied the corresponding confidence indexes, and calculated the final payoffs, even with an empty Core, 
as well as the formation of the grand coalition. Conceptually speaking, these approaches have the same aim, i.e., obtaining the 
final expected payoff. In both cases, a high confidence index represents an optimistic view about the final payoff. In practice, 
this can have a number of reasons; players, for instance, may have an optimistic view of their own bargaining power, or attach 
a high value to particular project benefits. Moreover, the confidence index can include a component related to uncertainty. 
When a player has a high confidence index, this can imply that that player has less uncertainty about getting a particular payoff. 
This is why, in our results, higher confidence indices lead players to prefer traditional electricity provision schemes. Further 
research is needed to explore the best way to accurately determine such index in the real world. As the confidence index is 
related to people’s beliefs and is beyond the financial conception of uncertainty, we think that social sciences, like sociology 
or psychology, may have a say on this matter. 
 
Again, following our mild assumptions, the findings presented above support the idea that community energy projects can 
provide stability to their members and be economically-strategically feasible or viable and competitive in comparison to other 
schemes, such as net billing (or distributed generation) schemes. According to our games and their results, the factors that 
determine the relative success of community energy projects, and then the relative success of the other two schemes, can be 
summarised as follows:  
 
a) Negotiation power and stability; if the players within a (potential) coalition can agree on distributing the payoffs in a way 
that all of them are satisfied and therefore their intention is to collaborate and remain inside the coalition, then that 
coalitional formation should be prioritised. However, the negotiation power can make the difference in terms of 
implementing a particular scheme (forming a particular coalition). For example, as shown above, both residential 
customers may block the distributor and then form the community energy coalition. 
b) Confidence; the players’ confidence affects the coalitional formation as revealed beforehand. For example, in games 2, 
3, and 4, it can be seen that the distributor/supplier’s confidence influences the formation of the community energy 
coalition, when it reaches any value under a certain threshold. 
c) Market conditions and payoff estimation; our calculations are based on the determination of income and expenses, and 
therefore coalitional payoffs. These values, at the same time, are based on market data like energy injection and 
consumption rates, overnight costs, investment costs, interest rates, etc. Any different payoff estimation may influence 
the coalition formation shown in this work. One extreme example of this could be a situation where both net billing and 
community energy initiatives have the same payoffs to be weighted by the confidence index. Here, the coalition formation 








Based on all the aforementioned elements, some recommendations can be given: 
 
1. Focus on community energy schemes instead of others, if a higher citizen participation in energy production is desired. 
2. Evaluate the provision of long-term financial arrangements, considering the corresponding compensation or recovering 
mechanisms, in order to improve access to community energy projects. This may include promoting PPAs and other 
contracts that can improve a project’s income generation and the recoverability of private/public funding. 
3. Promote stronger collaboration amongst people in order to facilitate the formation of stable coalitions. In this sense, 
sharing/distribution rules based on biform games might be useful. 
4. Define explicit public policies and goals related to the above-mentioned points, in order to have measurable and verifiable 
milestones of progress. 
 
We finally highlight that our examples based on biform games appropriately represent the community energy emergence 
problem, as it simultaneously models their non-cooperative and a cooperative stages. Biform games are therefore more realistic 
and useful tools than conventional one-stage approaches. As a counterfactual, for instance, if only the cooperative side of the 
problem is addressed, by using the Core or the Shapley value, the outcome would only give information about how players 
should distribute the payoff within a specific coalition, without being able to quantify the level of competition between different 
types of schemes. Conversely, without modelling a cooperative stage, results about the economic feasibility of community 
energy projects may be overly optimistic, as the need for a feasible distribution of payoffs is neglected. Consequently, we think 




This paper proposes a simple but novel approach for demonstrating the economic-strategic viability of community energy 
projects, which adapts biform game theory to energy markets. Given the increasing importance of the community energy 
sector, we see many opportunities to use biform games, which are still relatively unknown in comparison with other game 
theoretical tools. Using these tools will help to better understand the underlying economics of the sector. 
 
Using publicly available real-world data, we model simple biform games for Chile and Scotland. Under mild assumptions, it 
is possible to see the economic-strategic viability and competitiveness of a wider implementation of community energy 
projects in both countries, as it appears to be the best strategy for residential customers. Consumer confidence is crucial, unless 
a significant gap between incomes and costs exists (e.g., because of subsidies), in which case the importance of that confidence 
is reduced. Our examples also uniformly show that the less uncertainty (alternatively, the more confidence) consumers have, 
the more traditional their electricity provision is likely to be. 
 
The results shown in this work are in agreement with the current Scottish situation in community energy development, and 
they are useful for other countries, like Chile, that are trying to increase citizen participation in energy production. Fostering a 
community energy sector could be especially critical in developing countries like Chile, where this sector is still incipient 
while political attention is predominantly focused on other mechanisms, such as net billing. Community energy projects could 
contribute to the efforts to halt climate change, increasing the renewable energy participation in electricity markets, 
strengthening local economies, and improving the quality life of communities. Of course, there are challenges, especially in 






More research about the economics of the community energy emergence and more knowledge about other aspects that might 
be crucial to this sector are necessary, especially those matters that are not accounted in this analysis. With this paper, we 
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